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 NOTE 
Missouri Campaign Reporting Requirements 
in the Shade of Citizens United 
Geier v. Missouri Ethics Commission, 474 S.W.3d 560 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) 
Benjamin N. Levin* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1914, future Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, writing about the 
corrosive effect of concentrated capital on democratic institutions, said, “Sun-
light is said to be the best of disinfectants.”1  One hundred and three years 
later, the mandatory disclosure of political contributions and expenditures 
remains one of the most popular tools governments use to enlighten citizens 
about the machinations of politics.2  In an era where political contributions 
and expenditures are less regulated than ever, disclosure requirements have 
taken on outsized importance.3 
In Geier v. Missouri Ethics Commission, the appellant, Gerald Geier, 
asked the Supreme Court of Missouri to consider the constitutionality of Mis-
souri’s reporting requirement statutes as applied to Stop Now!, an inactive 
political action committee (“PAC”).4  Geier argued that the reporting re-
quirement failed to meet the exacting scrutiny standard because the State’s 
interest in receiving reports of inactivity did not outweigh the burden placed 
on Geier by the requirement.5  This Note analyzes the court’s application of 
exacting scrutiny in the instant decision.  It also notes the limits of PAC dis-
closure requirements as a public policy tool in the absence of sensible laws 
regarding what is and is not a PAC and discusses the practical import of nar-
row disclosure regulations in an era increasingly dominated by unlimited and 
independent political expenditures.  The limits of Missouri’s PAC disclosure 
 
* B.A., University of Missouri, 2014; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School 
of Law, 2017; Senior Note & Comment Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2016–2017.  I 
am grateful to Professor Christina Wells for her thoughtful and generous advice, as 
well as the talented staff of the Missouri Law Review for their feedback throughout 
the editing process. I am also thankful to my friends and family who reviewed drafts 
of this note, both for their superlative suggestions and their ceaseless support. 
 1. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW BANKERS USE IT 65 
(1914). 
 2. See Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L.J. 
273, 273 (2010). 
 3. Id. at 274. 
 4. Geier v. Mo. Ethics Comm’n, 474 S.W.3d 560, 560 (Mo. 2015) (en banc). 
 5. Id. at 565–66. 
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requirements, illuminated by the court’s reasoning in the instant decision, will 
continue to hinder the average Missouri citizen’s ability to participate in his 
or her democracy, while enabling the richest Missourians to operate in the 
shade, away from the disinfecting light envisioned by Justice Brandeis. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
In 1991, Gerald Geier created and registered the PAC “Stop Now!” with 
the Missouri Ethics Commission (“MEC”), with the intention of advocating 
against ballot initiatives to raise taxes in the Kansas City area.6  In 2003, the 
PAC became inactive, and in 2006, the PAC’s bank account was closed after 
bank fees depleted its balance to zero.7  Geier did not notify the MEC of the 
account’s closure as required under Missouri Revised Statutes section 
130.021.7.8 
The PAC, while bereft of any funds from 2006 onward, remained regis-
tered with the MEC, and from 2004 to 2010, Geier continued to file quarterly 
disclosure reports as required under Missouri law.9  In the first three quarters 
of 2011, Geier did not file these reports, at which point the MEC opened an 
investigation.10  Following the opening of the investigation, Geier filed the 
overdue reports and the necessary paperwork to dissolve the PAC.11  Despite 
the dissolution of the PAC, the MEC filed a complaint against Geier, in his 
capacity as its treasurer, for failing to file the 2011 disclosure reports on time 
and for failing to notify the MEC that Stop Now!’s bank account was closed 
in 2006.12 
Following a finding of probable cause against Geier in a closed hearing, 
Geier appealed to the Administrative Hearing Commission (“AHC”).13  Geier 
admitted the statutory violations but attacked the constitutionality and ap-
plicability of the statutes themselves.14  First, he argued the reporting statutes 
were unconstitutional as applied in this case under the First Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution because Stop Now! was inactive prior to the MEC’s 
enforcement action, and, therefore, the application of the reporting statutes to 
inactive PACs ran afoul of the exacting scrutiny standard.15  Under Citizens 
United v. Federal Elections Commission, exacting scrutiny is applied to all 
campaign reporting statutes.16  Second, he argued the requirements imposed 
 
 6. Id. at 562–63. 
 7. Id. at 563. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 565. 
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such a burden that they had a chilling effect on the political speech of oth-
ers.17  Third, he challenged the constitutionality of the MEC’s closed hearing 
under the First Amendment and Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.18  
Lastly, Geier argued any violations of law had to be attributed to Stop Now!, 
and not him personally, because there was no mechanism to hold an individu-
al liable for a campaign committee’s violations.19 
The AHC rejected the first and second claims because it has no authori-
ty to invalidate statutes for any reason.20  That power, according to the AHC, 
was reserved to courts of law.21  On the issue of personal liability for the ille-
gal conduct of a PAC, the AHC found that Missouri Revised Statute section 
130.058 designates a committee treasurer personally responsible for fulfilling 
the reporting requirements.22  Gerald Geier was the treasurer of his PAC.23  
On this basis, the AHC entered summary judgment for the MEC.24  Geier 
appealed, adding a claim that the reporting requirement was unconstitutional 
not only as applied, but facially as well, because of its chilling effect on polit-
ical speech.25  The Circuit Court of Jackson County, after considering the 
AHC’s rulings in an appellate capacity, also granted summary judgment for 
the MEC.26  Geier appealed to the Supreme Court of Missouri. 
The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the circuit court properly 
granted judgment in favor of the MEC because campaign disclosure regula-
tions, as regulations on speech, are subject to “exacting scrutiny.”27  For a law 
to survive exacting scrutiny in a First Amendment context, there must be a 
substantial relationship between the law and a sufficiently important govern-
ment interest that reflects the seriousness of the burden imposed on a citizen’s 
First Amendment rights.28  The Supreme Court of Missouri determined that 
the MEC’s regulatory scheme did indeed serve such an interest and that this 
interest was present, even if the PAC was inactive.29  The court reasoned that 
the interest survived because the MEC would have no way of knowing, ab-
sent a termination statement, which non-filing PACs were shirking their re-
porting duties and which were actually inactive.30  Meanwhile, the Supreme 
 
 17. Id. at 569. 
 18. Id. at 569–70. 
 19. Id. at 571. 
 20. Geier, Mo. Admin. 12-2243 EC (Mo. Admin. Hearing Comm’n June 11, 
2013), 2013 WL 4436626, at *5–6. 
 21. Id. at *4. 
 22. Id. at *6. 
 23. Id. at *2. 
 24. Id. at *6. 
 25. Geier v. Mo. Ethics Comm’n, 474 S.W.3d 560, 563 (Mo. 2015) (en banc). 
 26. Id. at 564. 
 27. Id. at 565 (quoting Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 
366 (2010)). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 568. 
 30. Id. at 567. 
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Court of Missouri did not reach Geier’s substantive argument that the report-
ing statutes are facially unconstitutional because they chill speech, ruling that 
the issue was not justiciable because it was contingent on future events and 
facts that Geier did not allege in his petition.31  The court also did not accept 
Geier’s argument that a closed administrative hearing was unconstitutional 
under the First and Sixth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution because the 
Sixth Amendment only guarantees a public trial when criminal liability is 
possible, and Geier’s hearing could not have led to such liability.32  In addi-
tion, there is no authority that has extended to the media a First Amendment 
right to attend an investigative proceeding for assessing non-criminal liabil-
ity.33 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This Part first covers the basic contours of Missouri campaign finance 
law, with a focus on the reporting requirements that ensnared Geier and Stop 
Now! in the MEC’s administrative procedures.  Next, this Part gives an over-
view of the First Amendment in its application to campaign finance law, with 
an emphasis on previous Eighth Circuit rulings that concern campaign fi-
nance law and the exacting scrutiny standard. 
A.  Reporting Requirements 
Under Missouri campaign finance law, every PAC shall have a treasurer 
with the authority to withdraw funds from a designated depository account.34  
A PAC like Stop Now!, which focused exclusively on ballot measures, is 
defined as “any combination of persons, who accepts contributions or makes 
expenditures for the primary or incidental purpose of influencing or attempt-
ing to influence the action of voters for or against . . . passage or defeat of any 
ballot measure.”35  The treasurer is the fiduciary of the committee and is re-
sponsible for creating, dissolving, and filing paperwork on behalf of the 
committee.36  The treasurer is responsible for disclosing all contributions to 
and expenditures from the designated bank account, along with the names of 
all contributors, all debts, and an accounting of the committee’s current bal-
ance.37  The treasurer must file these reports at least quarterly until the com-
 
 31. Id. at 571. 
 32. Id. at 570. 
 33. Id. at 570–71.  Although some federal courts have extended a First Amend-
ment right to access an adjudicatory hearing beyond strictly criminal proceedings, 
Missouri courts have not.  See In re Iowa Freedom of Info. Council, 724 F.2d 658, 
661–62 (8th Cir. 1983). 
 34. MO. ANN. STAT. § 130.021.4(2) (West 2016). 
 35. Id. § 130.011(9). 
 36. Id. §§ 130.021(5), (8). 
 37. Id. §§ 130.041, 130.058. 
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mittee has been dissolved, regardless of whether the committee has undertak-
en any activity in the previous quarter.38  Although the Missouri General As-
sembly does not provide legislative histories of its bills, it is safe to assume 
the public policy rationale behind these laws tracks the judiciary’s rationale 
for upholding them: To provide an informational benefit to the public, to 
combat the prospect of corruption, and to aid in enforcement actions for other 
violations of Missouri law.39  In 2008, Missouri’s campaign disclosure 
scheme was given a “B” rating from the Campaign Disclosure Project, rank-
ing seventh out of all states.40 
B.  The Missouri Ethics Commission 
The MEC is an administrative agency whose purpose is to administer 
and enforce the State’s campaign finance laws.41  If there are reasonable 
grounds for believing that a committee or a committee treasurer has violated 
these laws, the MEC will conduct a hearing pursuant to the Missouri Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, absent evidence that a criminal statute has been vio-
lated.42  The hearing will be closed, and a probable cause standard will be 
used to determine guilt.43  A person found responsible can appeal the finding 
to the AHC, which will stay the MEC’s decision until the matter is resolved.44 
C.  First Amendment 
Because the First Amendment was incorporated to the states in Gitlow v. 
State of New York, Missouri is required to abide by federal constitutional law 
concerning political speech when enforcing its campaign finance laws.45  In 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the Supreme Court of the 
United States noted that although disclaimer and disclosure requirements may 
burden the ability to speak, they are distinguishable from other burdensome 
 
 38. Id. § 130.046. 
 39. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 347, 357, 369 
(2010). 
 40. Campaign Disclosure Project, State-by-State Grade and Ranking Chart, 
CAMPAIGN DISCLOSURE, 
http://www.campaigndisclosure.org/gradingstate/rankoverall.html (last updated Sept. 
17, 2008). 
 41. Impey v. Mo. Ethics Comm’n, 442 S.W.3d 42, 44 (Mo. 2014) (en banc); see 
also § 105.955. 
 42. § 105.961(3). 
 43. See Impey, 442 S.W.3d at 45. 
 44. Id. (citing § 105.961). 
 45. Gitlow v. State of N.Y., 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“For present purposes we 
may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press – which are protected by 
the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress – are among the fundamental 
personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment from impairment by the States.”). 
5
Levin: Missouri Campaign Reporting
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
1200 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
campaign finance laws because they do not impose a ceiling on campaign-
related speech.46  This distinction matters because “laws that burden political 
speech are subject to strict scrutiny, which requires the Government to prove 
that the restriction ‘furthers a compelling government interest and is narrowly 
tailored to achieve that interest.’”47  Disclaimer and disclosure laws, although 
burdensome in the sense that it takes time and effort to comply with them, are 
subject to exacting scrutiny, a lesser standard.48 
Exacting scrutiny requires both a finding of a substantial relation be-
tween the speech-burdening regulation and a legitimate governmental inter-
est, as well as a finding that the governmental interest is sufficiently im-
portant to justify the burden imposed.49  In a 2006 case concerning a pro-
posed photo identification voting requirement, the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri held that the government has a compelling interest in ensuring the integ-
rity of the election process.50  In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court noted 
that disclosure requirements “deter actual corruption and avoid the appear-
ance of corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the 
light of publicity” and “as a general matter, directly serve substantial gov-
ernmental interests.”51  Exacting scrutiny requires a court to calculate, com-
pare, and, in effect, weigh the governmental interest against the actual burden 
the government is placing on the party’s First Amendment rights.52 
In the past, courts using this standard have deemed unconstitutional cer-
tain disclosure requirements created by the Federal Bipartisan Campaign Re-
form Act.53  In 2012, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Minnesota Citi-
zens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, ruled that a Minnesota law requir-
ing any non-PAC “association” to report, on an ongoing basis, all political 
expenditures in excess of $100 was unconstitutional because such laws failed 
to survive exacting scrutiny.54  According to the court, the independent-
expenditure disclosure law “does not match any sufficiently important inter-
est.  Minnesota can accomplish any disclosure-related interests . . . through 
less problematic measures . . . .”55 
In a similar case, Iowa Right To Life Committee, Inc. v. Tooker, the 
Eighth Circuit in 2013 ruled unconstitutional an Iowa law requiring a non-
profit corporation that had made political expenditures of $750 in a calendar 
year to disclose all funds raised over $1000 on an ongoing basis, regardless of 
 
 46. 558 U.S. 310, 316 (2010) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976)). 
 47. Id. at 340 (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 
U.S. 449, 464 (2007)). 
 48. Id. at 366 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64, 66). 
 49. Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 196 (2010). 
 50. Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 217 (Mo. 2006) (en banc). 
 51. 424 U.S. at 67–68. 
 52. Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 744 (2008). 
 53. See id. at 739, 744. 
 54. 692 F.3d 864, 874–75 (8th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
 55. Id. at 876. 
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whether that fundraising was for a political purpose.56  According to the 
court, the statute did not survive exacting scrutiny because “[r]equiring a 
group to file perpetual, ongoing reports ‘regardless of [its] purpose,’ and re-
gardless of whether it ever makes more than a single expenditure, is ‘no more 
than tenuously related to’ Iowa’s information interest.”57 
In Minnesota Citizens, the court compared the amount of funds needed 
to be raised before imposing reporting requirements to the amounts needed in 
other states.58  It found that reporting thresholds above $20 were generally 
held constitutional, while thresholds at or below that amount were generally 
held unconstitutional.59  Although both Iowa’s and Minnesota’s reporting 
thresholds far exceeded $20, the court nonetheless overruled both reporting 
statutes, choosing to focus instead on the “collective burdens” and costs of 
complying with the “cumbersome ongoing regulatory burdens,” whose opera-
tion can discourage participation in the political sphere.60  However, in both 
cases, the courts also limited their holdings to non-PAC associations.61  The 
reason for this forbearance, which makes non-PAC entities less regulated and 
less transparent than PACs, was not given.62 
Gerald Geier also pointed to the chilling effect of Missouri’s regulatory 
scheme on other citizens as a reason to find the whole statute facially uncon-
stitutional.63  The Eighth Circuit in Minnesota Citizens did find the “chill” of 
Minnesota’s statute to be “more than a theoretical concern,” because the law 
has “interfered with the open marketplace of ideas” and “discourages associa-
tions . . . with limited resources[] from engaging in protected political 
speech.”64  A Missouri court, following the Eighth Circuit’s lead, would pre-
sumably need to find a statute so onerous that its enforcement would actually 
deter political association and engagement by third parties in the future before 
finding for the plaintiff. 
Although the language and application of Missouri’s reporting statutes 
are fairly simple and conceptually straightforward, the Eighth Circuit’s case 
law applying an exacting scrutiny standard in a political speech context is 
sparse and frequently unclear.  The Supreme Court of Missouri, in spite of 
these vagaries, applied an exacting scrutiny standard in the instant decision.65 
 
 56. 717 F.3d 576, 606 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 57. Id. at 597 (second alteration in original) (quoting Minn. Citizens Concerned 
for Life, 692 F.3d at 873). 
 58. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, 692 F.3d at 884. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 871, 874. 
 61. Id. at 877; Iowa Right To Life, 717 F.3d at 592. 
 62. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, 692 F.3d at 877 n.11; Iowa Right To Life, 
717 F.3d at 594 n.4. 
 63. Geier v. Mo. Ethics Comm’n, 474 S.W.3d 560, 569 (Mo. 2015) (en banc). 
 64. 692 F.3d at 874. 
 65. Geier, 474 S.W.3d at 565 (citing Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 196 (2010)). 
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IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
Geier presented multiple arguments of varying merit in his attempt to 
vacate the MEC’s ruling.  In the instant decision, the court lingered on its 
application of exacting scrutiny to the reporting statutes before quickly dis-
patching Geier’s objections both to the constitutionality of the closed admin-
istrative hearing and the constitutionality of the statutes under a “chilling 
effect” theory.  This Note will summarize these separate holdings in turn. 
A.  Unconstitutional Under an Exacting Scrutiny Standard 
 The court began its analysis by noting that the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Buckley v. Valeo held that campaign finance regulations operate to limit polit-
ical speech, the most fundamental of First Amendment activities, and are thus 
presumptively subject to strict scrutiny.66  It noted that under Citizens United, 
reporting and disclosure requirements are subject to exacting scrutiny, which 
it considered a lesser standard, requiring only the finding of a substantial 
governmental interest in the regulation and a finding that the interest out-
weighs the burden on speech imposed.67 
Using this framework, the court first held that disclosure and reporting 
requirements serve at least three sufficiently important interests, as identified 
in Buckley.68  First, the requirements serve an informational interest by giving 
citizens the ability to learn how money is flowing in politics.69  Second, they 
serve to deter actual corruption and the appearance of corruption.70  Third, 
they serve an enforcement interest by enabling the detection of other cam-
paign finance violations.71 
The court, for the purpose of comparing these interests against the bur-
den the reporting statutes placed upon Geier, assumed that the PAC was only 
an “issue PAC,” which narrows the governmental interest in regulating 
speech because there is a reduced risk of quid pro quo corruption72 when the 
money is not flowing to a candidate.73  This effectively removes the second 
interest from consideration, leaving only an informational interest and an 
enforcement interest as valid justifications for the reporting statutes applying 
to an issue PAC like Stop Now!. 
 
 66. Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976)). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66–68). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Quid pro quo corruption is “[a]n action or thing that is exchanged for another 
action or thing of more or less equal value; a substitute.”  Quid pro quo, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 73. Geier, 474 S.W.3d at 566 (citing Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 
Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 203 (1999)). 
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Yet here, instead of turning to the remaining governmental interests in 
regulating Geier’s specific PAC, the court noted that the MEC has a broad 
and compelling interest in preserving the integrity of the election process 
generally.74  But because this was an as-applied challenge, not a facial chal-
lenge, the court moved quickly from analyzing the legitimacy of the MEC’s 
mission in the broadest sense to analyzing Geier’s specific challenge.75 
The court started its inquiry at the heart of Geier’s argument, where he 
sought to analogize his situation to that of the plaintiffs in Minnesota Citi-
zens, which also centered around the burden imposed by an ongoing reporting 
requirement.76  The court summarized the holdings of Minnesota Citizens, 
paying particular attention to the Eighth Circuit’s holding that “the ongoing 
reporting requirement chilled speech because it forced any association, no 
matter how small, to decide whether exercising its constitutional right was 
worth navigating the regulatory red tape.”77  The court quickly decided the 
case was misapplied, since the Eighth Circuit plainly said its holding only 
applied to independent committees and did not affect PACs.78  The court not-
ed that since Stop Now! is a PAC, Minnesota Citizens does not ipso facto 
render Missouri’s reporting statutes unconstitutional.79 
With Minnesota Citizens dispatched, the court found a dearth of authori-
ty supporting Geier’s proposition that Missouri has no interest in the disclo-
sure of an inactive or terminated PAC.80  The court stated that “Stop Now!’s 
inactivity . . . does not alter the State’s interest in enforcing the reporting stat-
utes.”81  The court contemplated that without termination reports, the MEC 
would be unable to know when or if a PAC were dissolved for purposes of 
enforcing other campaign finance regulations and would additionally have no 
way to share with the public what the PAC’s current status was.82 
After finding a substantial interest in requiring an inactive PAC to file 
reports, the court moved to the next phase of exacting scrutiny by examining 
whether the statutes were related to the already-established substantial inter-
est.83  It described the operation of the statutes and, without hesitation, con-
cluded that they are related, stating that “the statutes serve the State’s inter-
ests by allowing it to track where the money is being spent – or, in Stop 
Now!’s case – where it was spent.”84 
 
 74. Id. (citing Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 217 (Mo. 2006) (en banc)). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. (citing Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 
873 (8th Cir. 2012) (en banc)). 
 78. Id. at 567. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 568. 
 84. Id. 
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Finally, the court completed its exacting scrutiny analysis by measuring 
the burden placed on Geier by these reporting requirements.85  Considering 
that Geier was only asked to fill out a one-page form, that Geier was aware of 
and complied with these requirements for many years, and that the termina-
tion statement only required information that he was obligated to have any-
way, the court decided that there was no more than a minimal burden placed 
on Geier’s First Amendment rights.86 
Put together, the court found that the reporting requirements meet the 
exacting scrutiny standard because there is a substantial governmental interest 
in providing accountability to the electorate, because the reporting require-
ments were substantially related to those interests, and because the interest 
was not outweighed by the burden placed on Geier’s First Amendment 
rights.87 
B.  Facially Unconstitutional Under the First Amendment 
The court began its analysis of Geier’s facial challenge of the reporting 
statutes by considering the MEC’s contention that the claim was not justicia-
ble.88  The court summarized a justiciable controversy as requiring both a 
personal stake arising from a threatened or actual injury, as well as a claim 
that is sufficiently developed to allow the court to make an accurate determi-
nation of the facts, resolve a present conflict, and grant specific relief.89  It 
quoted the U.S. Supreme Court in Texas v. United States in explaining a case 
cannot be ripe if it rests upon contingent future events that may not even oc-
cur.90 
The court took care to explain justiciability in the instant case because it 
considered Geier’s attempt to invalidate the reporting statutes based on a 
chilling effect on future political speech as an attempt to seek relief on behalf 
of others not before the court.91  With this in mind, the court drew attention to 
Geier not having proffered any evidence of similarly situated committees or 
future plans to create similarly situated committees.92  The court disagreed 
with Geier’s assertion that his own proclaimed fear of engaging in future 
political speech was sufficient to fix the ripeness issues here, stating that his 
assertion of a chilling effect, even if relevant to standing, “do[es] not address 
the ripeness of a pre-enforcement challenge to the reporting statutes on behalf 
of either hypothetically inactive PACs or Geier himself as a future PAC 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 568–69. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 569. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. (quoting Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998)). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
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treasurer.”93  Because the court determined that Geier’s challenge was con-
tingent on future events and did not involve a present conflict, it declined to 
reach the substantive question of whether the statutes are facially unconstitu-
tional and instead affirmed the judgment of the lower court.94 
C.  Unconstitutional Under the First and Sixth Amendments 
Turning finally to the least developed arguments made by Geier, the 
court began its analysis of Geier’s Sixth Amendment claim by stating that the 
MEC is an administrative body that conducted a hearing to determine if there 
was probable cause to believe that Geier violated the reporting require-
ments.95  The court noted that pursuant to Missouri Revised Statutes section 
105.961.1, this hearing “shall be a closed meeting and not open to the pub-
lic.”96  The court acknowledged that the Sixth Amendment provides for a 
right to a public trial in criminal prosecutions but disagreed with Geier’s as-
sertion that the closed hearing was criminal or quasi-criminal because there 
was no evidence in the record that the hearing did lead or could have led to 
criminal liability.97  It concluded that because there was no actual or potential 
criminal prosecution, Geier had no constitutional right to an open trial, and 
his claim that section 105.961.1 was unconstitutional as applied was therefore 
invalid.98 
The court began its analysis of Geier’s last-ditch First Amendment 
claim by noting that the First Amendment does provide “a qualified right for 
the news media and general public to attend criminal trials and proceedings,” 
and that, in some cases, this right had been extended beyond criminal pro-
ceedings in certain circumstances.99  However, the court noted again that this 
was not and could not have been a criminal proceeding. Because there was no 
authority cited that would grant the public or news media a right to attend a 
non-criminal investigative hearing of this type, the statute’s failure to provide 
an open hearing was not unconstitutional under the First Amendment.100 
V.  COMMENT 
First, this Part analyzes the merit of the Supreme Court of Missouri’s 
application of exacting scrutiny to the particular facts of Stop Now!’s case 
and Missouri’s reporting statutes.  Next, this Part examines the probable im-
pact of such a ruling in a post-Citizens United landscape and the implications 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 571. 
 95. Id. at 570. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 570–71. 
 100. Id. at 571. 
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for the future of Missouri’s ability to provide voters with information about 
political spending. 
A.  Missouri’s Disclosure Requirements Under Exacting Scrutiny 
In the wake of Citizens United, disclosure requirements are one of the 
few tools left to states as they endeavor to ensure accountability and fairness 
in their election processes.101  It is notable that in an opinion otherwise ex-
tremely hostile to campaign regulation, the reporting requirements of the Bi-
partisan Campaign Reform Act were not just upheld but celebrated as im-
portant tools allowing “the electorate to make informed decisions and give 
proper weight to different speakers and messages.”102  Yet in practice, states 
have had difficulty crafting reporting laws that manage to provide the real 
public benefits of disclosure without excessively burdening citizens and 
PACs’ First Amendment rights.103  In Geier, the Supreme Court of Missouri 
decided that Missouri’s disclosure scheme, and in particular its ongoing dis-
closure requirements, passes muster under an exacting scrutiny analysis.104  
However, upon close analysis of the Eighth Circuit’s prior decisions in this 
area and the policy rationale underlying Citizens United, the logic advanced 
by the court raises troubling questions about the future of reporting require-
ments in Missouri and highlights the need for clarity regarding the exacting 
scrutiny standard. 
The Supreme Court of Missouri distinguished Minnesota Citizens from 
the instant case because Stop Now! was a PAC and the Minnesota plaintiff 
was not.105  And indeed, the Eighth Circuit only overruled the reporting re-
quirement to the extent that it applied to associations not qualifying as PACs 
under Minnesota law and did not affect the regulation of Minnesota political 
committees.106  But just because the Eighth Circuit declined to reach the ex-
plicit question in Minnesota Citizens does not mean its analysis is inapplica-
ble.  Even though the Eighth Circuit in Minnesota Citizens ruled on non-
PACs and the Supreme Court of Missouri in Geier ruled on PACs, both ana-
lyzed similar reporting statutes with, crucially, the same level of scrutiny.107  
 
 101. See Jocyln Benson, Saving Democracy: A Blueprint for Reform in the Post-
Citizens United Era, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 723, 723 (2012). 
 102. See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 312 
(2010). 
 103. See id. 
 104. Geier, 474 S.W.3d at 565. 
 105. Id. at 567. 
 106. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 877 (8th 
Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s denial of the appel-
lants’ motion for a preliminary injunction to the extent it requires ongoing reporting 
requirements from associations not otherwise qualifying as PACs under Minnesota 
law.”). 
 107. Compare MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 10A.01 subdivs. 27, 28 (West 2016), with 
MO. REV. STAT. § 130.046 (Cum. Supp. 2013). 
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Not only are the reporting requirements similar and the constitutional tests 
identical, but the interests and burdens in both cases are aligned as well: In 
Minnesota Citizens and Geier, the government’s interest is providing infor-
mation to citizens, while the burden created by the statutes is placed on the 
appellants’ First Amendment rights.108 
For these reasons, the court’s determination that “on its face, Minnesota 
Citizens does not apply to this case” is unduly dismissive of the resonant par-
allels between the cases.109  Minnesota Citizens cannot be mechanically ap-
plied to Geier, but neither should its analytical framework be ignored.  Also 
unacknowledged in Geier is the Eighth Circuit’s 2013 ruling in Iowa Right 
To Life Committee, Inc. v. Tooker, where a similar ongoing reporting re-
quirement was ruled unconstitutional as applied because the ongoing report-
ing burden and termination notice burden placed on the Iowa plaintiff out-
weighed the State’s interest in providing accountability.110  Like in Minnesota 
Citizens, the plaintiff was not a PAC, but again, the exacting scrutiny analysis 
did not hinge on whether or not the organization was, formally, a PAC.111  
The court instead, when conducting its exacting scrutiny analysis, focused on 
the burdens imposed and interests sought in that specific case.112 
The informational interest reporting requirements fulfill is, first and 
foremost, a practical interest – it is only useful to the extent that it conveys 
materially useful information to the citizenry.  In contrast, contribution limits 
have a practical import (preventing actual corruption) but also have a substan-
tial symbolic dimension – citizens are heartened to know their leaders cannot 
be on the dole of moneyed interests and discouraged when candidates receive 
large amounts of contributions from the economic elite.113  Taking into ac-
count the practical nature of the interest considered in Tooker, the Eighth 
 
 108. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, 692 F.3d at 881 (“Under the exacting 
scrutiny framework, disclosure laws survive if the government shows ‘a relevant 
correlation or substantial relation between the governmental interest and the infor-
mation required to be disclosed.’” (quoting Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 
724, 744 (2008))); Geier, 474 S.W.3d at 569 (“In sum, the reporting statutes are sub-
stantially related to the State’s sufficiently important informational, accountability, 
and enforcement interests. . . . Further, they imposed no more than a minimal burden 
on Geier and Stop Now!’s First Amendment rights.”). 
 109. Geier, 474 S.W.3d at 567. 
 110. Iowa Right To Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker, 717 F.3d 576, 599 (8th Cir. 
2013) (“The perpetual supplemental reporting requirements discourage groups from 
participating in the ‘open marketplace of ideas protected by the First Amendment.’” 
(quoting Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 354 (2010))). 
 111. Id. at 589–91 (engaging in extensive discussion of the exacting scrutiny 
standard with no weight given to whether the Iowa Right To Life Committee was or 
was not a PAC). 
 112. Id. at 592–96. 
 113. Patrick O’Connor, Influence of Money in Politics a Top Concern for Voters, 
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Circuit’s holding is not surprising: From a voter’s perspective, there is little 
help offered by requiring a small Iowa non-profit to perpetually file reports 
that show no political activity.  The courts in both Tooker and Minnesota 
Citizens avoided the idea that there is an intrinsic interest in making every 
group report all its activity – such an interest is grounded in the actual, practi-
cal value of information that is given to voters.114 
Michael Gilbert of the University of Virginia conceives the information-
al interest as containing an inherent tradeoff between the chilling effects of 
disclosure and the value of source revelation – the idea being that if too much 
reporting is allowed to occur, the overall amount of information in the polity 
will decrease because the value of the chilled (and thus lost) speech will out-
weigh the value of knowing where the remaining speech comes from.115  Gil-
bert fears a situation that reduces the amount of information beyond what is 
warranted because of the ephemeral power assigned to the informational in-
terest.116  The Eighth Circuit’s hostility to reporting schemes in the context of 
exacting scrutiny as applied against smalltime donors – that is, its minimiza-
tion of the interests sought and emphasis on the burdens imposed – is unsur-
prising and sensitive to the real tradeoffs that Gilbert explores in relation to 
the informational interest. 
Whatever its reasons, the function of the Supreme Court of Missouri’s 
wholesale abandonment of Minnesota Citizens (and failure to even 
acknowledge the import of Tooker) is not so sensitive, and it instead creates 
space for its own unmoored application of exacting scrutiny to Missouri’s 
disclosure requirements.  Recall that Geier’s sin was failing to file timely 
disclosure forms that would have shown a totally defunct PAC.117  The bur-
den on Geier’s First Amendment right is small – the forms are short and do 
not ask for especially detailed information.118  And the State has a sufficient 
interest, affirmed by Citizens United, in maintaining some sort of disclosure 
regime that provides accountability to voters.119  Although at first glance the 
 
 114. Iowa Right To Life, 717 F.3d at 590; Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. 
v. Swanson 692 F.3d 864, 873 (8th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
 115. Michael D. Gilbert, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Information 
Tradeoff, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1847, 1863–65 (2013). 
 116. Id. at 1865. 
 117. Geier v. Mo. Ethics Comm’n, 474 S.W.3d 560, 563 (Mo. 2015) (en banc). 




XqD7aL8U1pwiDUTJOqJT6901ruZ (showing extent of information needed to com-
plete a statement of limited activity). 
 119. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010) (“The 
First Amendment protects political speech; and disclosure permits citizens and share-
holders to react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way.  This transparency 
enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different 
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“weighing” of the interest against Geier’s burden appears an easy task, it is 
important to remember this was an as-applied challenge – the court was not 
asked to scrutinize the general constitutionality of the reporting statutes but 
instead to evaluate their particular application here.120 
The court states, “Apart from Minnesota Citizens, Geier offers no au-
thority for the proposition that the State has no interest in receiving disclosure 
reports from inactive PACs.”121  But who says Geier needs any authority for 
this proposition?  The proposition seems to be a corollary – the justification is 
self-evident.  After all, the State’s interest in disclosure is based on a desire to 
provide information to its citizens regarding who is participating in their de-
mocracy and how.122  This interest dissolves in the case of Stop Now!, a de-
funct PAC that was emphatically not participating in Missouri’s democra-
cy.123  The court here has implicitly held there is a sufficient government 
interest in disclosing information about who is not participating in its democ-
racy.124  This holding has no home in the Eighth Circuit’s jurisprudence. 
So what is the relation between applying the reporting requirements to 
inactive PACs and the State’s interest in disclosing information about politi-
cal actors?  The court thought the State’s interest would be frustrated if inac-
tive PACs did not need to file reports because “the MEC would be forced to 
continually sift through each PAC that did not file disclosure reports to de-
termine which were shirking their disclosure obligations and which were 
merely inactive.”125  But nothing would require the MEC to sift through each 
PAC that did not file a report.  After all, it is easy to imagine a regulatory 
scheme where the absence of a report could convey the same information that 
a report showing total inactivity conveys now.126  In this scheme, the absence 
of a report would only be a violation when the PAC has, at any point over the  
speakers and messages. . . . We find no constitutional impediment to the application 
of BCRA’s disclaimer and disclosure requirements . . . .”). 
 120. Geier, 474 S.W.3d at 563.  Geier also made a facial challenge, but the court 
declined to rule on the issue because it was not ripe.  Id. at 569. 
 121. Id. at 567. 
 122. Id. at 566 (“Assuming that Stop Now! was truly an ‘issue PAC’ speaking 
only about tax-related ballot initiatives, the reporting statutes here must be justified by 
(1) the State’s interest in gathering data to detect other violations of campaign finance 
laws and/or (2) the informational interest: ‘the need to provide the electorate with 
information about the sources of election-related spending.’” (footnote omitted) 
(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66–68 (1976))).  The argument for an en-
forcement interest is even weaker than the argument for an informational interest 
because one cannot violate a campaign finance law by not engaging in political activi-
ty. 
 123. Id. at 565. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 567. 
 126. If political action is detected and accredited to a PAC that did not file a re-
port, the PAC would obviously be in violation of the reporting statutes.  Likewise, a 
PAC that filed a report would be in violation of the reporting statutes if political ac-
tion is detected that is not contained in its filing. 
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filing period, participated in the political process.  The court noted, “The 
MEC had no way of knowing, absent a termination statement, that Stop Now! 
had effectively dissolved.”127  Left unexplained is what the State’s interest is 
in knowing whether or not a political organization has legally dissolved when 
it is functionally inactive either way.  Although the State surely has justifica-
tion under an exacting scrutiny standard to force disclosures from PACs that 
participate in the political process, the rote application of this logic to defunct 
PACs like Stop Now! leaves many questions. 
B.  The Limits of Disclosure After Citizens United 
In Citizens United, the value attached to informing citizens about who is 
engaging in political speech is founded on the idea that citizens need the in-
formation about election-related spending to make informed decisions about 
candidates and political causes.128  Stated another way by one scholar, “The 
informational interest in disclosure is currently seen as a kind of inoculation 
against free speech in campaigns.”129 
Yet Citizens United, far from heralding in an era of transparency in 
American politics, quickly led to situations where secret independent donors 
anonymously gave tens of millions of dollars to independent advocacy 
groups, while smaller donors remained attached to schemes that forced them 
to disclose every source, and expenditure, of funds.130  In Missouri, well-
funded nonprofit groups have poured millions of dollars into Missouri cam-
paigns and candidates with no obligation to disclose where this money is 
coming from.131  If these organizations were to choose to organize as PACs, 
they would be forced to disclose the source and use of their funds under Mis-
souri’s reporting requirements.132  But why would they do that?  Citizens 
United is, on its face, friendly to state regulatory schemes that compel politi-
cal actors to disclose financial information.133  In reality, it has created a situ-
ation where small-time, largely innocuous actors like Gerald Geier are bur-
dened by Missouri’s reporting requirements, while large donors operate with 
 
 127. Geier, 474 S.W.3d at 567. 
 128. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010). 
 129. Anthony Johnstone, A Madisonian Case for Disclosure, 19 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 413, 433 (2012). 
 130. See Kenneth P. Vogel, A Look Back at 2010 Spending, POLITICO (Dec. 13, 
2010, 11:51 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2010/12/a-look-back-at-2010-
spending-046355 (last updated Dec. 14, 2010, 9:52 AM). 
 131. Jo Mannies, Missouri Groups with Secret Donors Have Big Impact, ST. 
LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Feb. 4, 2015), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/missouri-
groups-secret-donors-have-public-impact. 
 132. MO. REV. STAT. § 130.041.1 (2000). 
 133. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370–71. 
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less oversight, hidden in the shadows of their “independent” non-profit sta-
tus.134 
This policy failure cannot be laid at the feet of the Supreme Court – Cit-
izens United gave state and national legislators the bailiwick to enact stricter 
disclosure laws that would apply to all forms of political spending, not just 
spending through PACs.135  Fault instead lies with the legislators who have 
been unwilling to create schemes that pull independent expenditure commit-
tees out of the shadows.  In 2016, legislation was filed in the Missouri House 
of Representatives that would expand the MEC’s disclosure requirements to 
independent committees; however, it received no hearing.136 
On the federal level, independent expenditure committees have been the 
frequent target of complaints about a lack of transparency, complaints that 
could be resolved by the imposition of more stringent disclosure require-
ments.137  The only major legislative effort to strengthen disclosure require-
ments in the wake of Citizens United was the DISCLOSE Act, which was 
proposed in the immediate aftermath of the case and passed by the House of 
Representatives by a 219-206 vote.138  It was eventually defeated in the Sen-
ate, after a 59-39 party-line vote came one short of defeating a Republican 
filibuster.139  Although there is clearly a popular desire to expand reporting 
requirements at the state and federal levels, advocates have thus far been un-
successful in turning this desire into law.  The failure to meaningfully en-
hance reporting requirements since 2010 puts the lie to the assumption, made 
by many, that disclosure remains an “uncontroversial regulatory tech-
nique.”140  It might be more accurate to say it was the least controversial reg-
ulatory technique when regulators had a host of techniques to pick from – and 
therefore the one that enemies of campaign finance regulation spent the least 
time fighting.141  Now that the pickings are slim, reporting requirement re-
forms have, predictably, slowed or halted entirely.142 
The failure of legislative assembles across the country to adjust the 
scope of the reporting requirement is jarring in the wake of Citizens United, 
which left reporting requirements as one of few tools left in the box that had 
 
 134. Mannies, supra note 131 (“501C4s don’t have to report their donors or file 
detailed reports on their spending, as PACs must do.”). 
 135. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 371. 
 136. H.R. 188, 98th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015). 
 137. See David Frum, Twilight of the Super PAC, ATLANTIC (Feb. 24, 2016), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/super-pacs-2016/470697. 
 138. DISCLOSE Act, H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. (2009–2010). 
 139. Id. 
 140. See, e.g., Daniel R. Ortiz, The Informational Interest, 27 J. L. & POL. 663, 
664 n.9 (2012) (citing Briffault, supra note 2, at 274) (“Disclosure generally gets high 
marks from the public, academics, and the courts.  Opinion polls find very high levels 
of public support for campaign finance disclosure.  Among academics, both campaign 
finance reformers and campaign finance skeptics have endorsed disclosure.”). 
 141. See id. at 664. 
 142. Id. at 666. 
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clear support from eight Justices.143  After all, such regulations are essential 
to a functioning democracy: A comparative study published in the Election 
Law Journal found a strong correlation between the robustness of reporting 
requirements and the health of democratic legislatures.144  Anecdotal evi-
dence also vividly supports the conclusion that reporting requirements are 
important.145  In 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court was asked to weigh in on 
whether a due process violation occurred when a West Virginia appellate 
judge accepted a $3 million campaign donation from a mining company 
weeks before that same company would come before that judge seeking to 
vacate a $50 million trial court judgment entered against it.146  The Court 
ruled an ethical violation had occurred – a violation that might never have 
come to light had West Virginia not required the judge to report the dona-
tion.147 
From an equity standpoint, the current discrepancy in Missouri law that 
burdens committees like Stop Now!, while allowing others to push money 
into politics unhindered, represents a serious problem.  If the State indeed has 
a compelling interest in providing information to its citizens, then how can it 
not require the largest political spenders to provide basic donor information 
to voters?  It is easy to understand Geier’s frustration with the current 
scheme: He, operating on his own, was dragged through an administrative 
proceeding because he failed to adhere to reporting requirements that, if ful-
filled, would have shown precisely nothing, while other – actually meaning-
ful – players in Missouri politics plied vast sums into politics through mecha-
nisms that obviate any responsibility to reveal themselves.148 
From a pragmatic standpoint, situations like Geier’s could plausibly lead 
to an exodus from pre-Citizens United regulatory structures that channel 
money through Missouri PACs.  Now that independent non-profit committees 
can engage in unlimited political spending, it is difficult to imagine many 
cases where a person seeking to engage with a Missouri ballot initiative 
would choose to submit himself or herself to the MEC’s regulatory strictures.  
The reason that PACs were subject to these strictures was because their major 
purpose was to engage in politics.149  Independent committees, which had 
 
 143. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010). 
 144. Joel W. Johnson, Democracy and Disclosure: Electoral Systems and the 
Regulation of Political Finance, 7 ELECTION L.J. 325, 326 (2008). 
 145. Id. 
 146. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 873–74 (2009). 
 147. Id. at 886. 
 148. See Geier v. Mo. Ethics Comm’n, 474 S.W.3d 560, 563 (Mo. 2015) (en 
banc). 
 149. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 287 (4th Cir. 2008) (“Since 
designation as a political committee often entails a significant regulatory burden – as 
evidenced by the requirements imposed by North Carolina – the Court held that only 
entities ‘under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the nomina-
tion or election of a candidate’ can be so designated.” (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 79 (1976))). 
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only a limited ability to engage in politics, were not thought to deserve such 
treatment.150  In a world where the limits of independent committees to en-
gage in politics have been so eroded, this reasoning no longer makes sense.  
Until disclosure requirements move beyond this outdated logic, Missouri’s 
ability to provide its citizens with meaningful information about political 
spending will suffer.  And concerns about exacting scrutiny aside, Missouri-
ans like Gerald Geier will continue to play by different and more burdensome 
rules than other sophisticated and influential actors. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In Geier v. Missouri Ethics Commission, the court found Missouri’s re-
porting statutes constitutional as applied to the statutory violations committed 
by Stop Now!.  Lurking behind a unanimous (and largely pro forma) opinion, 
however, are substantial questions about whether there is a sufficient gov-
ernmental interest in disclosing to citizens the absence of political activity, as 
well as concomitant questions about whether there is a substantial relation-
ship between the disclosure requirements and the legitimate government in-
terest in providing information to voters in light of the burden placed on on 
Geier. 
Additionally, the court’s opinion raises questions about whether the dis-
tinction between PAC and non-PAC political actors is a pre-Citizens United 
artifice that mostly serves to punish actors, like Geier, who have organized 
under PACs, instead of as independent political spenders.  The constitutional-
ity of the disclosure statutes as applied to inactive PACs aside, it is hard to 
escape the conclusion that the policy merits of chasing citizens like Gerald 
Geier are weak.  Going forward, the Supreme Court of Missouri should clari-
fy the nature of the government’s interest in burdening citizens who have 
withdrawn from the political process, as well as the connection between this 
interest and the reporting requirement.  Missouri legislators, meanwhile, 
should confront the weakness of our campaign disclosure regulatory scheme 
by ensuring that the light provided by disclosure is reaching every corner of 
Missouri’s political landscape.   
 
 150. Id. 
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